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Introduction 
This brief document is one of a range produced by the authors as part of an ongoing 
project Amnesties, Prosecutions and the Public Interest in the Northern Ireland Transition.1 
This project, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC), is a 
partnership between Queen’s University Belfast School of Law, the Transitional 
Justice Institute at the University of Ulster and the local NGO Healing Through 
Remembering. Drawing upon previous comparative work conducted by McEvoy 
and Mallinder (with Brice Dickson), this project is designed to provide legal, 
historical and international information to local stakeholders on dealing with the 
past related issues in order to let people ‘make up their own mind’ on these difficult 
and sensitive matters. 
Over the past year the team have been meeting with victims, ex-security force 
personnel, former combatants, civil society groups, criminal justice leaders and all 
the main political parties to discuss these matters. At these meetings, we made an 
offer to all parties to make publicly available information on any technical aspects of 
these debates that might be useful for the ongoing public discussion. While there are 
of course very diverse views on these issues, a common feature of many of our 
discussions over the past year has been the desire for clear and accessible 
information. 
At a number of these encounters, we have been asked to provide ‘models’ as to how 
the issues of truth, prosecution and amnesty might intersect as part of efforts to deal 
with the past in Northern Ireland. In response to those requests, below are four 
possible models which chart how these issues might be managed. Before looking in 
detail at the models, it is important to note a number of issues that underpin all of 
the models. 
Requirements of the European Convention of Human Rights 
The British and Irish governments are parties to the European Convention of 
Human Rights. As such, they are required to abide by this convention and decisions 
issued by the European Court of Human Rights. With respect to Articles 2 (right to 
life) and 3 (freedom from torture and ill-treatment), the Court has found that not 
only must states refrain from committing these violations, but where they have been 
committed, states must also conduct investigations. Through its case law, the Court 
                                                 
1 To review the range of documents associated with the project including our submission to the 
Panel of the Parties of the NI Executive please visit http://blogs.qub.ac.uk/amnesties/resources/ 
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has repeatedly found that to comply with the convention, these investigations must 
be: 
 Effective 
 Prompt 
 Transparent 
 Independent 
With respect to effective investigations, the Court’s case law requires that 
independent, official investigations be conducted when individuals have been 
killed as a result of the use of force. In Finucane v UK, the Court said 
What form of investigation will achieve those purposes may vary in 
different circumstances. However, whatever mode is employed, the 
authorities must act of their own motion, once the matter has come to 
their attention. They cannot leave it to the initiative of the next-of-kin 
either to lodge a formal complaint or to take responsibility for the 
conduct of any investigative procedures.2 
In Nachova and others v Bulgaria, the Court further noted that 
In cases concerning the use of force by State agents, it must take into 
consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who 
actually administered the force but also all the surrounding 
circumstances, including such matters as the relevant legal or 
regulatory framework in place and the planning and control of the 
actions under examination.3 
The European Convention on Human Rights is only binding on state parties. This 
means that it creates obligations for the state in relation to the acts or omissions of 
state actors. This includes instances where there are allegations of collusion or the 
state was aware that an individual was a risk and failed to take sufficient measures 
to protect them. In a few cases, the Court has also held that Article 2 creates 
obligations in relation to killings committed by non-state actors: 
the obligation [to investigate Article 2 violations] is not confined to 
cases where it has been established that the killing was caused by an 
agent of the State. … [T]he mere fact that the authorities were informed 
                                                 
2 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Finucane v The United Kingdom (2003), Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2003-VIII, para 67. 
3 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Nachova and others v Bulgaria (2005) Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2005-VII, para 93. 
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of the murder … gave rise ipso facto to an obligation under Article 2 to 
carry out an effective investigation.4 
Furthermore, for any truth recovery process to be politically viable in Northern 
Ireland, it should investigate both the actions of state and non-state actors. 
The court’s case law has been clear however that the duty to investigate does not 
amount to a duty to prosecute. Instead, in Finucane v UK, the Court acknowledged 
the substantial challenges to prosecuting historic cases in Northern Ireland: 
It cannot be assumed in such cases that a future investigation can 
usefully be carried out or provide any redress, either to the victim's 
family or to the wider public by ensuring transparency and 
accountability. The lapse of time and its effect on the evidence and the 
availability of witnesses inevitably render such an investigation 
unsatisfactory or inconclusive, by failing to establish important facts or 
put to rest doubts and suspicions.5 
Similarly, in Brecknell v UK, the Court emphasised that there is ‘no absolute right’ 
for victims ‘to obtain a prosecution or conviction and the fact that an investigation 
ends without concrete, or with only limited, results is not indicative of any failings 
as such’.6 
With respect to amnesty, in the 2012 Tarbuk v Croatia case, the Court argued that 
even in such fundamental areas of the protection of human rights as 
the right to life, the State is justified in enacting, in the context of its 
criminal policy, any amnesty laws it might consider necessary, with the 
proviso, however, that a balance is maintained between the legitimate 
interests of the State and the interests of individual members of the 
public.7 
This suggests that an amnesty or ‘stay on prosecutions’ would comply with the 
European Convention on Human Rights provided that effective, prompt, 
independent and transparent investigations were conducted. 
                                                 
4 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Yasa v Turkey (1998) Reports 1998-VI, para 100. See also 
Ergi v Turkey (1998) Reports 1998-IV, para 82. 
5 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Finucane v The United Kingdom (2003), Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 2003-VIII, para 89. 
6 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Brecknell v The United Kingdom (2007) All ER(D) 416 
(Nov), para 66. 
7 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Tarbuk v Croatia (2012) Application no. 31360/10, para 
50. 
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Interpreting the Models 
In putting forward these models, we have drawn on a range of international sources 
of information, British and Irish experience of managing different styles of inquiries 
into the past and our practical experience as academics who have conducted 
extensive comparative research. We do not claim that these offer fully developed 
practice models with regard to truth recovery. They are designed to be broadly 
explanatory options to give readers a sense of the ways in which truth commissions 
or other truth recovery bodies are commonly linked to prosecutions, amnesty or use 
immunity. 
Many other elements of truth recovery design are highly significant to ensuring that 
such an institution meets the needs of victims and society, and can operate in an 
effective and impartial manner. These elements include issues such as the 
composition of those who are tasked with overseeing such a body and the staff who 
are employed by it, the power of the institution to make or recommend reparations 
for victims, the duration of the institution’s operations and its levels of funding. 
Although the authors recognise the importance of these elements, they are beyond 
the scope of this paper because as noted above, we are responding to requests to 
develop models solely on the question of how justice and amnesty can fit into truth 
recovery design. 
The models presented below are therefore heuristic approaches designed to help 
inform the political conversation. They should not be regarded as entirely mutually 
exclusive. Elements of each may be borrowed in designing a suitable way forward 
and some of the pros and cons may be relevant to more than one model. 
The four models below are drawn from the international experience of how these 
issues have been addressed in other contexts (see bibliography) and from our 
conversations and interactions with local actors in Northern Ireland over the past 
year. 
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Model 1: ‘Stay on Prosecutions’ 
This model draws on the recent proposals by the Attorney General that legislation 
be enacted at Stormont, and possibly Westminster, to end all prosecutions, inquests 
and public inquiries related to the Troubles. This model would have a number of 
components: 
 The stay on prosecutions would apply to all crimes committed by state and non-
state actors 
 Offenders would be shielded from criminal liability automatically and would not 
be required to participate in any truth recovery processes in exchange for their 
immunity 
 Where individuals have already been convicted of conflict-related offences, those 
convictions would still stand 
As amnesty laws are generally defined by the objective of bringing to an end the 
possibility of criminal (and sometimes civil) liability for a specific group of people or 
offences, the Attorney General’s proposals amount to an unconditional amnesty for 
historic cases. 
From international models, a truth recovery process may follow a pre-existing 
amnesty. However, the Attorney General’s proposals did not recommend that any 
formal investigative body be established. Instead, he recommended that public 
archives be made available to victims, historians and journalists. 
Pros 
 As the Attorney General acknowledged when announcing his proposals, the 
prospect of successful prosecutions for historic cases is slim and is growing less 
and less each year. Introducing a legislative stay on prosecutions would formally 
recognise what is already a de facto reality. 
 In formalising that there would be no further investigations or prosecutions of 
historic cases, this proposal would create a climate of certainty and remove any 
‘false hope’ from the relevant victims. 
 The existing processes to deal with the past focus predominantly on investigating 
allegations against state actors, even though they were only directly responsible 
for approximately 10 per cent of conflict-related deaths. Closing down all 
investigations would end this imbalance. 
 The considerable archives held by the Public Prosecution Service relating to 
crimes committed by state and non-state actors cannot currently be made 
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available to victims, researchers or the general public while there is still a 
prospect of prosecutions. By formally ending all prosecutions, this potentially 
rich source of information could be opened, subject to controls to protect the 
right the life and national security. 
 The removal of the threat of prosecution might create a space where offenders 
are more willing to admit their actions. This could occur through informal truth 
recovery work conducted by non-governmental organisations, interviews with 
journalists or researchers, or through offenders publishing their own memoirs. 
 The recent CJINI report8 indicated that the existing processes to deal with the 
past cost the state approximately £30 million per annum. These proposals would 
be considerably reduce those costs, some institutions would cease to exist and 
others would drop their mandate to consider historic cases. As a result, only 
victims support bodies and the Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains 
(CLVR) would continue to work on dealing with the past. Indeed with regard to 
the CLVR, concerns have been expressed by some families of the disappeared 
that, in a context where all other past-related initiatives had been closed, there 
might be a significant political impetus towards ‘mothballing’ the CLVR as well. 
Cons: 
 Although amnesty measures may be permissible under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, an end to all investigations as the Attorney 
General proposed would not (in our view) be Article 2 compliant. 
 The Attorney General’s proposals were met with strong condemnation from 
victims’ organisations, human rights campaigners and all the political parties 
with the exception of the NI21. Regardless the terminology used, many appeared 
to view these proposals as an unconditional amnesty. 
 It is unlikely that the political parties will be willing to agree to this model. 
 A formal decision to end investigations of the past is unlikely to end victims’ 
desire for truth and accountability. 
 A ‘stay on prosecutions’ would not prevent stories related to the past continually 
filtering in public discourse, albeit in an unmanaged fashion. Such a failure to 
‘manage’ the past carries with the risk of political instability. 
                                                 
8 Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland, A Review of the Cost and Impact of Dealing with the 
Past on Criminal Justice Organisations in Northern Ireland (2013) available at 
http://www.cjini.org/TheInspections/Inspection-Reports/Latest-Publications.aspx?did=1283  
3 December 2013  AMNESTY, TRUTH AND PROSECUTION MODELS  
  Page 8 
   
 
  
Model 2: Truth Commission and Amnesty 
The breadth of international experience concerning the establishment and running of 
truth commissions provides considerable information that would inform this model. 
Specifically, a commission would be established and tasked with examining events 
that occurred during the conflict in and about Northern Ireland. Depending on its 
mandate, the commission would investigate individual cases and specific events; the 
causes, context, and consequences of violence; as well as patterns of abuse and 
thematic issues (e.g. collusion, allegations of IRA ethnic cleansing along the border). 
After consultation, the commission would be established by new legislation put 
forward by the two governments, but as an independent institution free from 
interference by either the British or the Irish government. The commission would sit 
in Northern Ireland, but arrange to take evidence from a range of affected 
communities. Its remit would be sufficiently broad to examine events that occurred 
in relation to the conflict in and about Northern Ireland anywhere on these islands, 
or indeed overseas. The commission would incorporate the current work of the 
Historical Enquiries Team, the historical investigations of the Office of the Police 
Ombudsman NI and the inquest system for conflict-related killings. 
In exploring how amnesty can be embedded within a truth commission, Model 2 
draws explicitly from truth commissions that were empowered to grant or 
recommend an amnesty for clearly specified categories of crimes, in particular, 
South Africa,9 Grenada,10 Timor Leste (twice),11 Kenya,12 and Liberia.13 This model 
can be distinguished from model 3 (below) by a number of features. In Model 2: 
 Offenders would be encouraged to come forward voluntarily rather than 
compelled. The amnesty mechanism would be used to incentivise participation 
by former combatants and members of the security forces and intelligence 
services. The commission would be required to engage in outreach to raise 
awareness of the process. 
                                                 
9 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995 (South Africa). 
10 Grenada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established under the Commissions of Inquiry 
Act 1990, Section 2. The amnesty process is detailed in Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Report on certain political events which occurred in Grenada 1976-1991, Volume 1, Part 7 (2001). 
11 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2001/10 on the 
Establishment of a Commission for Truth, Reception and Reconciliation in East Timor (2001) Section 
32; Terms of Reference for the Commission on Truth and Friendship between Indonesia and Timor 
Leste (2006) Section 14(c)(i). 
12 Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act 2008 (Kenya) Part 3. 
13 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2005 (Liberia) Section 26(g). 
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 In response to concerns from some sectors in Northern Ireland society regarding 
what they regard as ‘the myth of equivalency’ between state and non-state actors, 
this model would envisage separate panels to review applications from state and 
non-state actors, as illustrated in Figure 1. The panels to review amnesty 
applications and, where appropriate, hold hearings would be separate from the 
panels that engage with victims. 
 The legislation would clearly specify what crimes or groups of offenders are 
eligible for amnesty. 
 To obtain an amnesty, state and non-state actors would be required to submit pro 
forma amnesty application forms. 
 Depending on the nature of the crimes or incidents they are involved with, they 
may also be required to meet with the commission. These meetings could be part 
of a dialogue that develops during the life of the commission. 
 To be granted an amnesty, applicants would be required to disclose fully the 
truth about their actions and cooperate fully with the work of the commission. 
This was the approach taken in South Africa, where amnesty was granted only in 
respect of acts, omissions or offences that were fully disclosed to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. This created an incentive for offenders to disclose all 
their criminal acts. Model 2 follows a similar approach in that the amnesty would 
only cover criminal acts disclosed by the offender. 
 Testimony from state and non-state actors would not simply be taken ‘at face 
value’. To ascertain whether their testimony was truthful, all information 
provided would be rigorously interrogated and crosschecked against all 
available corroborating sources (including potentially intelligence information) 
and victim testimony. 
 The truth commission mandate should provide clear guidance to the 
investigative body on the nature of the information that offenders would be 
required to disclose to make a complete application, including whether they 
should supplement written submissions with documentary and physical 
evidence. This guidance should be applied uniformly to all applications to ensure 
the fairness of the process. 
 A successful amnesty application would negate both criminal and civil liability 
for the disclosed offences. However, and crucially, it would not represent a 
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denial that the crimes had actually occurred. Such an amnesty would not 
represent an effort to re-write history.14 
 It is envisaged that the legal effects of a successful amnesty application would be 
different for state and non-state actors. For non-state actors, the primary benefit 
would be the expunging of criminal records. 
 For state actors, the primary benefit would be that once a state actor had fulfilled 
the responsibilities associated with providing information to the commission, 
they would no longer be required to cooperate with the current range of open-
ended ‘case by case’ mechanisms for dealing with the past. 
 Where an amnesty applicant did not fully cooperate with the commission, 
amnesty would be denied, depending on the circumstances, they could be 
charged with perjury or contempt, and they could also be liable for prosecution if 
other future evidence of their criminal acts is forthcoming. 
 Individuals who are denied amnesties would have the right to appeal. 
 Truth commissions that offer or recommend amnesty, generally also have the 
power to subpoena individuals to appear before the commission and produce 
documents. Truth Commissions can also require witnesses to testify under oath. 
 Where witnesses are compelled to testify, commissions are expected to respect 
the privilege against self-incrimination and to guarantee use immunity (see 
Model 3) with respect to compelled evidence. They would also usually offer 
confidentiality and/or anonymity to witnesses where it is in the public interest to 
do so or where the witnesses might be endangered by their identity or testimony 
becoming public. 
                                                 
14 This issue is well illustrated in a recent case examining the impact of the granting of amnesty by 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The case concerned Robert McBride, a 
controversial former member of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the military wing of the African National 
Congress (ANC). Mr McBride bombed a bar in Durban in 1986 in which three civilians were killed and 
69 people injured and was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. He was subsequently 
released as part of the political negotiations, and applied for and was granted an amnesty by the 
TRC. In 2003, Mr McBride was in line for a senior policing appointment, and The Citizen newspaper 
(which was vehemently opposed to his appointment) published a number of critical articles 
referring to him as a murderer and a criminal. Mr McBride sued for defamation, arguing that the 
amnesty granted to him meant that he could not be so described. The Constitutional Court found 
against Mr McBride, arguing that: ‘The statute's aim was national reconciliation, premised on full 
disclosure of the truth. It is hardly conceivable that its provisions could muzzle truth and render 
true statements about our history false. It further concluded that although the amnesty in effect 
expunged the murder in terms of its impact on Mr McBride's civic right to employment, to run for 
office, and so forth, it did not mean that newspapers or citizens had to conduct discourses on the 
past as if events had not happened.’ See Citizen v. McBride, Case CCT 23/10, Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, [2011] ZACC 11. 
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Additional design challenges might include whether the commission is empowered 
to meet with offenders in public and/or in private; whether the amnesty process 
includes mechanisms to enable victims to communicate the impact of the crimes on 
their lives, to challenge offender statements, and where victims would like to, to 
participate in restorative meetings with offenders that are mediated by the 
commission; and whether truth commission reports could name offenders who had 
been granted amnesty. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of a truth recovery process 
incorporating amnesty: 
Figure 1: Truth Commissions and Amnesty 
 
Pros 
 A robust truth commission, even with the powers to grant amnesty for violations 
of Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, has the potential to 
deliver effective independent investigations that if properly implemented would 
satisfy the investigative requirements of Article 2. 
 Amnesty may encourage former state actors and non-state actors to come 
forward and offer full disclosure. 
 Testimony from even a comparatively small number of former combatants and 
state actors would contribute to a more information being revealed than would 
be possible if the commission relied solely on archival records or victim 
testimony. 
 It should also lead to richer testimony rather than compelling hostile witnesses. 
 Where even a small number of offenders voluntarily discuss their actions, their 
stories can provide a unique source of information on the institutional contexts 
Chief 
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and vertical command structures which gave rise to and perpetuated violence 
during the Troubles. 
 A multiplicity of voices would improve the legitimacy and the public standing of 
the truth commission and ‘narrow the space for permissible lies’. 
 The fact that state and non-state actors were participating in a voluntary process 
would be an important symbolic act of reconciliation. 
 Unlike Model 1, by requiring individuals to account for their actions, this model 
offers a greater degree of offender accountability. 
Cons 
 Where the chances of historical prosecutions are slim, ex-combatants and state 
actors will be less likely to apply for amnesty. 
 There are challenges in corroborating offender testimony, particularly where 
documentary evidence is missing or unreliable, which is predominantly the case 
for crimes committed by non-state actors. 
 As with Model 1, the use of ‘amnesty’ is likely to attract political controversy. 
 Where the amnesty outcomes include not just immunity from criminal or civil 
proceedings, but also the possibility of the erasing conflict-related criminal 
records or the reducing impediments to ex-prisoners with conflict-related 
convictions in accessing employment, goods, facilities and services, this may 
make the amnesty more difficult to accept for some victims and survivors. 
 Based upon the experiences of other jurisdictions, it is possible that 
individualised amnesty processes may become overly legalistic. 
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Model 3: Truth, Investigation and Use Immunity 
Where a truth commission or other investigative body has the power to compel 
testimony from individuals, it may offer ‘use immunity’ to witnesses. According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘use immunity prohibits the witness’ compelled testimony and its 
fruits from being used in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the 
witness’ (emphasis added). Use immunity provisions are designed to protect the 
rights of witnesses who are requested or compelled to testify. Rather than 
undermining human rights, this provision is designed to protect the right against 
self-incrimination that is enshrined in international human rights law 15  and the 
domestic law of most countries. 
In contrast to amnesties, which are internationally controversial, use immunity even 
for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is widely accepted in 
international law and policy. For example, it is an established feature of the work of 
the international criminal tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda which 
dealt exclusively with the most serious international crimes including war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity. 16  It is also enshrined in the rules of 
procedure and evidence which govern the conduct of the International Criminal 
Court – which again only deals with the most serious of international crimes. 17 It is 
also explicitly recognised by the United Nations as one of the elements which may 
be necessary to the establishment of a viable truth commission.18 
Many of the generic features of a truth recovery bodies are outlined in Model Two 
above. The key difference with regard to this model is the fact that state actors, 
former combatants and others could be compelled to appear before the truth recovery 
body rather than encouraged to appear voluntarily in the hope of an amnesty. 
Again, it is precisely because of the compellability of witnesses that ‘use immunities’ 
would be required in order to protect the rights of such witnesses. In making the 
case in favour of such methods in his seminal overview on Tribunals of Inquiry Lord 
Salmon argued; 
                                                 
15 See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14(3)(g). The privilege 
against self-incrimination is not specifically mentioned in the fair trial proceedings detailed in 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the European Court of Human 
Rights has found that it may be read as implicit in Article 6. See e.g. Funke v France, 1993, 16, 
EHRR, 297. 
16 See eg International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Rule 90(e). 
17 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 74. 
18 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict 
States: Amnesties (2009) 34. 
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No doubt the extension of a witness’s immunity entails the risk that a 
guilty man may escape prosecution. This would be unfortunate but it 
is surely much more important that everything reasonably possible 
should be done to enable a Tribunal to establish and proclaim the truth 
about a matter which is causing a nationwide crisis of confidence than 
that a guilty man should go free.19 
In addition to its widespread usage internationally, use immunity guarantees are a 
familiar tool in UK and Irish law as mechanisms which are used to facilitate 
investigations into allegations of past abuses. In the common law tradition, normally 
such guarantees that the evidence he/she gives cannot be used against a particular 
witness come in the form of letter from the Attorney General, triggered by a request 
from the Chair of the relevant inquiry. As James Beer QC explains; 
Many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General 
provide an undertaking prohibiting the use of evidence provided to 
the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking 
is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing they are not at 
risk of subsequent prosecutions on the basis of it, and to ensure that 
inquiries are not delayed or obstructed by witnesses invoking the 
privilege against self-incrimination.20 
Thus for example, such undertaking featured in inquiries such as the Ladbroke 
Grove Rail Inquiry (into the Paddington Railway crash in which 31 people were 
killed) the Macpherson Inquiry (into police investigation of Mr Stephen Lawrence’s 
murder) and the Baha Mousa Inquiry (into the death of an Iraqi civilian while in 
military custody in Basra, Iraq). The principal caveat to such guarantees usually 
relates to the giving of false evidence to the inquiry. By way of illustration, in the 
Baha Mousa Inquiry, the Attorney General gave an undertaking that; 
No evidence a person may give before the Inquiry, will be used in 
evidence against that person in any criminal proceedings or for the 
purpose of deciding whether to bring such proceedings … Where any 
such evidence is provided to the Inquiry by a person, it is further 
undertaken that, as against that person, no criminal proceedings shall 
be brought (or continued) in reliance upon evidence which is itself the 
                                                 
19 Lord Sir Cyril Salmon, Tribunals of Inquiry (Oxford University Press, 1967) 17. 
20 Jason Beer QC (ed) Public Inquiries (Oxford University Press, 2011) 326. 
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product of an investigation commenced as a result of the provision by 
that person of such evidence.21 
Equivalent guarantees have given in the operation of a number of past-related 
inquiries during the Northern Ireland conflict and transition. For example, the 
Cameron Commission which was established in 1969 to investigate civil 
disturbances from October 1968, operated under a guarantee given by the Attorney 
General on behalf of the government of Northern Ireland. That guarantee was that: 
(1) No statement made to the Commission of Enquiry, whether orally 
or in writing, will be used as the basis of a prosecution against the 
maker of the statement or for the purpose of prosecution of any person 
or body of persons. (2) No such statement will be used in evidence in 
any criminal proceedings…22 
In a similar fashion the public inquiries into the events of Bloody Sunday, the 
murder of Robert Hamill and Rosemary Nelson were all underpinned by similar 
undertakings from the Attorney General. The Billy Wright Inquiry chose not to 
request such an undertaking but informed its witnesses that individual requests, 
supported by reasons, would be considered. Again by way of illustration, regarding 
the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, the UK Attorney General gave: 
An undertaking in respect of any person who provides evidence to the 
Inquiry, that no evidence he or she may give before the Inquiry 
relating to the events of Sunday 30 January 1972, whether orally or by 
written statement, nor any written statement made preparatory to 
giving evidence, nor any document produced by that person to the 
Inquiry, will be used to the prejudice of that person in any criminal 
proceedings (or for that purpose of investigating or deciding whether 
to bring such proceedings) except proceedings where he or she is 
charged with having given false evidence in the course of this Inquiry 
or with having conspired with, aided, abetted, counsel procured, 
suborned or incited any other person to do so.23 
                                                 
21 Letter from Attorney General Kristin Jones, 31 December 2008, ‘The Baha Mousa Inquiry: Self-
Incrimination’. The letter went on to indicate that the guarantee did not apply where to 
prosecutions for civil or military offences, where a person was charged with having given false 
evidence to the Inquiry or conspired with others to do the same. Available at 
http://www.bahamousainquiry.org/linkedfiles/baha_mousa/key_documents/rulings1.pdf, Annex A. 
22 Lord Cameron, Report of the Disturbances in Northern Ireland. Cmnd 532 (HMSO, 1969), Chapter 
One, paragraph 4. Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cameron.jpg 
23 Attorney General Press Release, 25 February 1999, available at http://bloody-sunday-
inquiry.org.uk  
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Similar mechanisms exist in the Irish Republic and a range of other common law 
jurisdictions. For example, section 8 of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) 
(Amendment) Act 2002 in the Republic provides that ‘A statement or admission 
made by a person before an investigator shall not be admissible as evidence against 
the person in any criminal proceedings’.24 A number of inquiries in the Republic 
have offered different versions of immunity for witnesses giving evidence. Most 
germane for current purposes is the immunity offered by the Smithwick Tribunal 
(investigating allegations of collusion in the deaths of RUC Officers Harry Breen and 
Bob Buchanan). That tribunal has operated under equivalent provisions and indeed 
the UK Attorney General gave an undertaking that no criminal proceeding would 
result in the United Kingdom against persons as result of admissions they had made 
to the Tribunal which was of course taking place in the Republic.25 
The deployment of this style of truth recovery does not necessarily rule out future 
prosecutions but the emphasis of such a model is to focus primarily on truth 
recovery. This can be contrasted with Model 4 which explicitly seeks to facilitate 
prosecutions. 
The core components (some of which would overlap with elements of Model 4 
below) are: 
 In this model, all of those giving evidence would be treated as witnesses, 
therefore victims, state actors and non-state actors would all be afforded the same 
protections in terms of any admissions of criminal behaviour. 
 Witnesses would be entitled to see documents to help them prepare to participate 
in hearings and would be entitled to independent legal representation. 
 Given the presence of legal representatives, careful consideration would have to 
be given to develop mechanisms and working practices which would prevent the 
proceedings from becoming overly legalistic. Such mechanisms should be 
designed in collaboration with the Bar Council and Law Society. In addition, in 
order to ensure that costs did not become prohibitive, a fee arrangement could be 
negotiated which ‘ring-fenced’ a suitable amount of money for legal fees and 
ensured that these were capped at an appropriate level. 
 Under this model, careful consideration should be given as to whether or not 
protected statements would only protect the person giving evidence (as is the 
norm) for most inquiries or whether the protection should be extended to 
evidence so that it could not be used to prosecute third parties (as with the 
                                                 
24 Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act, No 7 of 2002, Section 8. 
25 Notice 09/01 available at http://www.smithwicktribunal.ie/smithwick/HOMEPAGE.html 
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Cameron Commission). In a context wherein a lot of individuals could 
potentially be compelled to give evidence to a truth recovery mechanism, there is 
an obvious risk that the process could become ‘bogged down’ if people were 
willing to discuss their own involvement in past events but unwilling to discuss 
the actions of others for fear that this might lead to the prosecution of former 
colleagues. Prosecution would still be possible for perjury.  
 All testimony from whatever source would need to be verified, interrogated and 
cross-checked (similar to Model 2). 
Figure 2 illustrates the structure of this model. 
Figure 2: Truth Recovery and Use Immunity 
 
Pros 
 Such an approach (facilitating truth in return for immunity) has a long-
established tradition both in international legal and transitional justice 
proceedings but also in the common law traditions of the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland. 
 While this does not provide total immunity from prosecution for witnesses, it 
ensures that the evidence they provide before the truth commission cannot be 
used as evidence against them in a later criminal proceeding. 
 This mechanism would facilitate the compulsion of witnesses to attend and give 
evidence ‘where it is reasonable, just and necessary to do so and where there is 
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no manifest security risk to the compelled person’.26 Granting the truth recovery 
body the power to compel witnesses might in turn increase public confidence in 
the operation of the institution. 
 However, in such circumstances, it is difficult to envisage any successful truth 
recovery mechanism which did not offer some protection to witnesses against 
self-incrimination as a result of the evidence they might give to such a body. 
 It would attract less controversy that often surrounds the use of the term 
amnesty, particularly since it follows models that have consistently featured in 
some existing processes in Northern Ireland to deal with the past. 
 By requiring offenders to provide evidence before the commission, depending on 
resources, this model could facilitate engagement with larger numbers of state 
actors and non-state actors than may be possible under a voluntary amnesty 
scheme. 
 It could enable the commission to compel high profile individuals to appear 
before a commission who may otherwise be reluctant to apply for amnesty. 
 As this process is not reliant on the voluntary engagement of state actors and 
non-state actors, it could require subpoenaed individuals to testify in public or 
private hearings. 
 As the scope of immunity is less than for an amnesty, this provision might be 
more acceptable to those who are opposed to leniency for conflict-related 
offences. 
Cons 
 Although many truth commissions recommend in their final report that there be 
criminal prosecutions or judicial investigations leading to possible prosecutions 
for the events that they have documented, the reality is that if evidence had been 
aired in a truth recovery process might make subsequent prosecutions all the 
more difficult. 
 As noted above, an obvious challenge to immunity guarantees which are 
restricted only to the person giving the evidence is that more comprehensive 
truth recovery would probably require admissions about the involvement of 
other actors. However, for both state and non-state actors, if specific admissions 
by a witness of the involvement of others could be used for subsequent 
prosecutions against former colleagues or comrades, this might well inhibit the 
                                                 
26 Mark Freeman Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge University Press 2006) 252. 
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willingness of such witnesses to be completely frank and thus reduce the capacity 
for the truth recovery mechanism to maximise effective truth recovery. 
 Public admissions by individuals of their involvement in previous human rights 
violations could in turn render such individuals vulnerable to future attack, thus 
raising Article 2 concerns about the protection of witnesses. Such considerations 
were advanced in order to support the anonymity granted to the soldier who 
gave evidence to the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. However, in camera hearings or the 
granting of anonymity and/or the screening of witnesses could in turn impact on 
the public credibility of any truth recovery mechanism – thus the striking of the 
balance must be handled sensitively. 
 By treating all state and non-state actors as witnesses before the Commission, 
some state actors in particular might object to what they regard as ‘the myth of 
equivalency.’ To maximise buy-in from state parties, and their political 
supporters, it might be necessary to consider whether parallel processes for state 
and non-state actors which guaranteed them equal protection under the law 
could be devised. 
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Model 4: Truth Recovery and Prosecutions 
Truth commissions or similar bodies are mostly established in the early years of a 
political transition, when widespread criminal investigations have not yet been held. 
In some cases, criminal investigations begin concurrently with a truth commission or 
similar truth recovery body. However, more commonly, truth commissions operate 
in contexts where trials are not viable and may not be possible for many years due to 
the need to establish stability, build the capacity of the national justice system, and 
reform the legal professions. In such contexts, truth commissions are often designed 
to fill the ‘vacuum left by an ineffective national justice system’.27 They may also be 
intended to complement and facilitate eventual prosecutions. They can do this in the 
following ways: 
 While the commission is ongoing, it may forward evidence of crimes to 
prosecutors on a confidential basis. 
 If trials have already begun while the commission is operating, where 
appropriate, it may also provide the courts with exculpatory evidence relating to 
persons who have been charged. 
 Following the completion of its work, the commission may refer to the national 
authorities on a confidential basis, the names of the alleged perpetrators, 
evidence collected or other information. 
 Its final report may recommend prosecutions be conducted. 
 Its final report may also recommend reforms to facilitate prosecutions. 
In all these instances, the responsibility for initiating prosecutions continues to rest 
with the national prosecuting authorities. 
To date, approximately 40 truth commissions have been created around the world 
and most of these bodies have recommended that prosecutions be pursued in their 
final reports, even though most truth commission have offered some form of 
amnesty or use immunity for offender testimony. For example, the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation emphasised the importance of prosecutions for those 
offenders who did not apply for amnesty or for whom amnesty was denied.28 In 
most cases, for reasons often outside the control of the truth commissions, very few 
prosecutions resulted from their recommendations.29 There may also be instances 
                                                 
27 Amnesty International, Commissioning Justice: Truth Commissions and Criminal Justice (2010) 
28 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenges of Truth 
Commissions (2nd ed, Routledge 2011) 93. 
29 Ibid 282-3. 
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where a truth commission actually harms the prospect of prosecutions by 
undermining the prospect of a fair trial by naming alleged perpetrators or by failing 
to preserve evidence adequately.30 
Even where criminal trials are not immediately viable, some human rights bodies 
have issued opinions stating that truth commissions are not an adequate substitute 
for prosecutions.31 This suggests that the possibility of future prosecutions should be 
protected while a truth commission is operating. However, these opinions relate 
predominantly to truth commissions that did not actively seek, and consequently, 
did not substantially receive offender testimony. Furthermore, as outlined in the 
introduction, the European Court of Human Rights does not require that 
prosecutions result from investigations of Article 2 violations. 
If a truth commission or a similar truth recovery body was established in Northern 
Ireland, it would operate in a distinct context with respect to prosecutions in 
comparison to truth commissions established elsewhere. The primary difference is 
that the Historical Enquiries Team, which was established in 2005, had a mandate to 
review cases of conflict-related deaths and where there is sufficient evidence, to refer 
the case for criminal prosecution. However, the 1860 cases that it has reviewed since 
2005 have only resulted in three convictions. This suggests that the possibility of 
prosecutions resulting from any future truth commission is limited. 
Despite these challenges, retaining the possibility of prosecutions is important for 
many victims and their families, who may be deeply resistant to any form of 
leniency for perpetrators of serious crimes, even where it is offered in exchange for 
truth. Amnesty International supports this position by opposing the inclusion of any 
form of amnesty or use immunity in truth commission mandates, preferring instead 
that cooperation with a truth commission only be taken into account as a mitigating 
factor during sentencing in any subsequent trials.32 Taking account of the enduring 
demand for trials among some victims and human rights organisations, Model 4 
seeks to explore how a future truth commission could be designed to maximise the 
                                                 
30 Mark Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge University Press 2006) 83-
4. 
31 See eg Human Rights Committee, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under 
article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Chile, 
CCPR/C/CHL/CO/5, 17 April 2007, par. 9; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 
28/92, Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309 and 10.311 (Argentina), 2 October 1992, para. 
42-52, at para. 50; Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 36/96, case 10.843 
(Chile), 15 October 1996, para. 75 and 77. 
32 Amnesty International, Commissioning Justice: Truth Commissions and Criminal Justice (2010) 
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potential for future criminal proceedings. Figure 3 illustrates how this model will be 
designed. 
Figure 3: Truth Commission and Prosecutions 
 
The core components of Model 4 are as follows: 
 The commission would have the power to subpoena evidence and compel 
testimony, with penalties for non-compliance. 
 All individuals who provide evidence to the commission, including victims and 
offenders would be treated as witnesses. 
 When interviewing witnesses, the commission will need to conduct its 
investigations in a manner appropriate to the gathering of evidence that would 
be admissible for criminal proceedings. This may mean that commission 
investigators are required to interview some individuals under caution and it 
may mean that meetings with victims are more formal and legalistic that would 
otherwise be required. 
 The truth commission must inform all witnesses of any possible uses or legal 
consequences of their statements including for example, whether their 
information may be forwarded to the Public Prosecution Service. 
 Gathering evidence that may be used in criminal proceedings may also require 
that former police officers work within the commission. 
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 Where the commission believes that a witness may be the subject of future 
criminal proceedings, it may prefer to interview him or her in confidential, 
private meetings in order to avoid prejudicing any subsequent trials. 
 Preserving the possibility of fair trial may also mean that the Commission 
prevents victims identifying perpetrators in public hearings and that the 
Commission itself refrains from naming names in its final report or public 
statements. 
 Even if the commission is not empowered to offer use immunity, all witnesses 
including the alleged offenders should be guaranteed their rights, including the 
rights to remain silent; to not be compelled to testify against themselves; and to 
be presumed innocent. Alleged offenders should also have the right to legal 
representation. 
 Where a witness might be endangered by his or her identity or testimony 
becoming public, or where it is in the public interest to do so, the commission 
may give guarantees of confidentiality or anonymity in order to protect the safety 
of individual witnesses. Such guarantees would preclude the commission 
identifying these individuals to the Public Prosecution Service and it may require 
them to redact any evidence that is transferred. 
 Where compelled individuals provide false testimony under oath, they could be 
prosecuted for perjury. 
 They could also face legal penalties where they fail to comply with a subpoena. 
 During or upon conclusion of the commission’s work, it may forward 
incriminating evidence to the Public Prosecution Service. If a commission is 
empowered to do this, it should have clearly established criteria for determining 
what evidence should be shared. 
 In a statement provided by an individual to the truth commission is used as 
evidence to convict him or her in a subsequent criminal prosecution, then his or 
her previous cooperation with a truth commission should be a mitigating factor 
during sentencing which may lead to a reduction in the sentence. 
 If appropriate, it may publicly call for prosecutions in its final report and it may 
make recommendations relating to the pursuit of prosecutions. 
 Memorandums of understanding between the truth commission, the Public 
Prosecution Service and other criminal justice agencies should be developed to 
regulate cooperation between these bodies. This could, for example, determine if 
truth commission investigators would be permitted to interview individuals in 
prison or in pre-trial detention. 
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Pros 
 Model 4 may result in a small number of prosecutions. 
 Model 4 retains the possibility of justice that, even if prosecutions do not result, 
may be symbolically important for many victims and their families. 
 Model 4 is less likely to attract political controversy then Models 1 and 2. 
 By using investigative methods appropriate to gathering criminal evidence, the 
‘truth’ produced by the commission may be viewed as more robust and 
methodologically sound. 
Cons 
 The absence of amnesty and use immunity, coupled with the possibility of 
prosecutions and the need to interview some witnesses under caution, will make 
it unlikely that alleged offenders will provide information relating to their own 
crimes and they may be less likely to provide evidence relating to the institutions 
within which they worked. 
 The need to use investigative methods appropriate to the gathering of criminal 
evidence may result in encounters with victims being more legalistic and less 
sensitive to the way the victim want to tell their story and the details that they 
wish to emphasise. 
 Individuals convicted of scheduled offences committed before 1998 would only 
serve a maximum of two years under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. 
 Retaining the possibility of prosecutions may preclude the Commission from 
accessing active case files held by the Public Prosecution Service. 
 Where successful prosecutions of historic cases are unlikely, preventing a 
Commission from naming offenders may reduce the scope for non-judicial forms 
of accountability. 
 The legalistic nature of this commission means that it is likely to be more 
expensive than the other models. 
 The individualised focus on gathering criminal evidence for particular cases 
could mean that less consideration would be given to larger thematic issues – the 
causes, context and consequences of violence – which are the usual focus of a 
truth recovery process. 
 If truth recovery body were tasked with investigating institutional responsibility, 
it may reasonably decide to investigate the role of state agencies (such as the 
police, military, security services and the Public Prosecution Service). However, 
given that prosecutions might result, this might well adversely impact on the 
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working relationships between such a truth recovery body and at least some of 
these bodies, the staff of which might ultimately be liable for prosecution. 
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Conclusion 
As noted in the introduction to this brief report, we were asked by a number of 
political and civil society interlocutors to develop practical models on the 
intersection between truth, amnesties and prosecutions. Mindful of the local 
circumstances of Northern Ireland and traditional approaches to inquiries about the 
past in both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, these heuristic and 
somewhat overlapping models are designed to help inform local political and civil 
society debate. As was stressed earlier, our hope is that they will help to provide a 
framework within which to have a measured conversation on these difficult and 
sensitive issues. 
Based on our experience as academics with significant familiarity of working on 
these issues locally and internationally, it is our view that it is possible to devise a 
bespoke method of truth recovery which is both technically robust (in terms of 
maximising the potential for truth) and legally compliant with international and 
domestic law in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. 
Kieran McEvoy and Louise Mallinder, 3 December 2013 
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